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Clinical Research in a Public Health Crisis:
The Integrative Approach to Managing Uncertainty
and Mitigating Conflict
∗

Alex John London, Ph.D.
ABSTRACT

In order to advance science while preserving social solidarity and
institutional trust, clinical research must carefully manage ethical
tensions created by the two overlapping dynamics of conflict and uncertainty. One of these dynamics is inherent in the research enterprise itself and the other arises in the particular context of a public
health emergency. One test for both the moral soundness and practical utility of a framework for research ethics is its ability to help
stakeholders understand and manage these ethical tensions as much
as possible. After clarifying the dynamics that give rise to these tensions, this paper argues that two common approaches to evaluating
clinical research have significant shortcomings in this regard. This
paper then sketches and defends the integrative approach to managing these tensions.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Mounting an effective response to an outbreak of pandemic influenza presents a profound public health challenge. Whether we
are able to meet this challenge in a way that can avoid a public health
catastrophe will depend on a variety of factors, two of which are particularly important for the purpose of the present discussion. The
first factor is our ability to strengthen the public health infrastructure, broadly construed, in its capacity to carry out, on a large scale,
public health response measures ranging from vaccination, prevention, detection, social distancing, and treatment, to the maintenance
of sanitary environmental conditions in a context in which the various systems that contribute to this end may be strained by high mortality rates and the fear of contagion. A vigorous and proactive pro∗
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gram of clinical and public health research has an important role to
play in strengthening the capacity of the public health infrastructure
to achieve some of these goals. Undoubtedly, it is best to mount such
a program before such an outbreak has been detected. But even in
the midst of an outbreak, clinical research may have an important
role to play.
A second critical factor in our response to an outbreak of pandemic influenza is our ability to maintain a broad sense of social solidarity, including an open relationship of trust between community
members and the basic social institutions that are supposed to safeguard and advance their interests. I will use the term “social solidarity” to refer to a public sense of cohesiveness and interdependence
among community members in which their awareness of a shared
plight, and a shared fate, increases the likelihood of working across
social divisions in order to achieve a common goal. I will use the
term “institutional trust” to refer to the willingness of community
members to believe the information that they receive from basic social and governmental institutions, to rely on and comply with their
instructions, and to provide various forms of cooperation and support for their efforts.
Just as the presence or absence of social solidarity and institutional trust can influence the prospects for carrying out valuable clinical and public health research in an emergency context, when and
how research is conducted can have an important impact on both social solidarity and institutional trust. In the discussion that follows, I
assume that an acceptable framework for planning and assessing research in an emergency setting should be adequately responsive to
each of these concerns. That is, an acceptable framework should ensure not only that research can generate the information that will
enhance the capacity of the health infrastructure of a community to
respond to a particular threat, but it should also ensure that research
is carried out in a way that embodies, and communicates to the public, certain facts about the basic social and governmental institutions
of the community. In particular, acting on the basis of such a framework should enable institutions to demonstrate that they appreciate
the gravity of the situation that is unfolding, that they are exercising
legitimate authority without bias or antipathy, and that they are using
appropriate methods for the purpose of safeguarding and advancing
the interests of community members.
The following discussion describes how the integrative approach
to clinical research reconciles these potentially competing demands.
In Part II, this Essay discusses the two interconnected dynamics of
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conflict and uncertainty that any acceptable framework for evaluating
research during the course of a public health crisis must navigate and
reconcile. In Part III, this Essay discusses the shortcomings of two existing frameworks for evaluating risk in clinical research and how
these shortcomings may be amplified by the special features of a public health crisis. In Part IV, this Essay outlines the integrative approach and explains how it avoids the shortcomings of these other
frameworks and manages the dynamics of conflict and uncertainty
discussed in Part III. In Part V, this Essay provides examples of past
instances of clinical trials during the course of a health crisis and discusses the relevance of the integrative approach to these examples.
Part VI concludes by noting some features of the integrative approach that require further development and by emphasizing some
of the unique challenges public health emergencies pose for balancing the interests of different stakeholders in the system.
II. CONFLICT AND UNCERTAINTY IN A PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS
The central challenge facing an acceptable framework for evaluating clinical research in the context of a public health crisis is how
to navigate two interlocking dynamics of conflict and uncertainty.
The first dynamic is related to the research enterprise itself as a
means of moving the community from a state of conflict or uncertainty about how to respond to a health threat, to one of greater certainty or coherence. In particular, there is in the research enterprise
an inherent potential for conflict between the interests of current research participants and those who might benefit in the future from
such increased understanding. The second dynamic is related to the
special circumstances of a public health emergency. Uncertainty is
likely to be pervasive in this context, and both the effects of the
emergency and the means that are used to respond to it may create
or exacerbate social divisions that fall along fault lines such as race,
class, socio-economic status, age, and gender. It is worth saying a bit
about each of these dynamics in turn.
Inherent in the research enterprise is the potential for conflict
between the interests of current research participants and the interests of the future beneficiaries of that research. This potential for
conflict is itself partly a function of various kinds of uncertainty that
attend the research enterprise. Consider the status quo at some
point in time where there is uncertainty in the expert clinical community about how best to treat a particular medical condition. Perhaps the condition is novel, and no effective interventions currently
exist. Perhaps there are accepted interventions, but their relative
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therapeutic, diagnostic, or prophylactic merits are unclear, or a matter of dispute. In either case, the purpose of clinical research is to
pose a well-defined research question that, if answered, will either
eliminate this uncertainty or make a substantial contribution to its
elimination.
If we can think of the research enterprise as a kind of bridge that
takes the community from a state of uncertainty to a state of greater
clarity, then research participants are, in effect, the vehicles that
make this possible. They bear the risks and burdens associated with
purely research-related procedures, and they undergo procedures or
are provided with interventions with relatively unclear merits, as part
of an effort to generate the information that will ensure that future
patients receive a better standard of care.
Whether this potential for conflict materializes in practice will
hinge, in part, on how it is addressed. Institutional Review Boards
(IRBs) are charged, among other things, with the task of ensuring
that risks to participants are reasonable in light of benefits that might
accrue to them, or in light of the value of the information that will be
1
generated from the research. This means that the risks to research
participants can be justified by potential benefits to those partici2
pants, but they need not be. Those risks may be justified entirely by
3
the social value of the research. Moreover, as the importance of the
research increases, so increases the level of risk to which research
4
participants may be exposed permissibly.
How this potential conflict has been managed in the past has also influenced the public’s attitude toward the research enterprise
and the uncertainties that attend it. Several commentators have
noted that social attitudes toward biomedical research in the United
States have vacillated at times between paradigms of protectionism
5
and a right to access. In the protectionist paradigm, novelty is associated with risk, and the research enterprise itself is regarded as inhe-

1

Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(2) (2008).
See id.
3
See id.; see also Charles Weijer, Thinking Clearly About Research Risks: Implications
of the Work of Benjamin Freedman, IRB: REV. HUM. SUBJECTS RES., Nov.–Dec. 1999, at 2.
4
See 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(2).
5
See Anna Mastroianni & Jeffrey P. Kahn, Swinging On the Pendulum: Shifting
Views of Justice in Human Subjects Research, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May–June 2001, at
21 (discussing the shift in federal testing policies from centering around protection
of subjects to focusing upon the desire for new research).
2
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6

rently dangerous. To some degree, this may reflect a collective unease about the potential for a shift in moral norms when one undertakes an activity in which participants are valued less for who they are
and what they can do as individual persons or agents, than for what
can be learned from the aggregate data that is collected from or
7
about them. Undoubtedly, however, such feelings of distrust are,
more concretely, grounded in and inflamed by revelations of abuse in
the research context. For example, the legacy of the now infamous
Tuskegee syphilis study continues to play a role in an undercurrent of
distrust of public health in general and public health research in par8
ticular in African American communities.
On the other hand, the access paradigm emphasizes the power
of clinical research as an engine for discovery. Important discoveries
not only increase our understanding of sickness and disease, but also
provide the tools to intervene in order to reduce morbidity and mortality, improve quality of life, and give people the information they
need to make better informed decisions. As a result, when a particular problem, condition, or population is the focus of clinical or public
health research, the odds increase that members of that population
who face that problem or condition in the future will benefit from
this process of inquiry. Less uncertainty will surround various aspects
of the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of the condition, and medical personnel are more likely to have better alternatives for effectuating desired clinical or public health outcomes. Alternatively, when
problems, conditions, or populations are not the focus of clinical or
public health research, the state of the art for addressing them is unlikely to advance or change significantly. As a result, those who are
excluded from research participation are likely to face greater risks

6

Jeffrey P. Kahn et al., Implementing Justice in a Changing Research Environment, in
BEYOND CONSENT: SEEKING JUSTICE IN RESEARCH 166, 168 (Jeffrey P. Kahn et al. eds.,
1998).
7
Cf. Hans Jonas, Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects, 98
DAEDALUS 219, 219–20 (1969) (suggesting that once tests are performed on living beings, as compared to inanimate objects, “questions of conscience arise”); Alex John
London, Threats to the Common Good: Biochemical Weapons and Human Subjects Research,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.–Oct. 2003, at 17 (discussing two different conceptions
of the common good and their differential relation to individual rights and liberties
in the face of a perceived public health threat, such as would be posed by biological
and chemical terrorism).
8
See Vicki S. Freimuth et al., African Americans’ Views on Research and the Tuskegee
Syphilis Study, 52 SOC. SCI. & MED. 797, 799 (2001); Jan M. McCallum et al., Awareness
and Knowledge of the U.S. Public Health Service Syphilis Study at Tuskegee: Implications for
Biomedical Research, 17 J. HEALTH CARE FOR POOR & UNDERSERVED 716, 717 (2006).
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when they access the health system to the extent that less is known
9
about their condition, or fewer options are available to treat it.
An analogue to this population-level view exists at the individual
level. This is the idea that clinical research often employs the best
and the brightest in the medical community and uses the most rigor10
ous methods to administer the most cutting-edge care. On this view,
there are substantial benefits to being in clinical research, not just for
those who have the condition under study, but for those who partici11
pate in individual trials.
Managing this dynamic of conflict and uncertainty under normal or non-emergency circumstances can be difficult. The revelation
that research participants have been abused or treated unfairly can
cause public attitudes to shift in protectionist directions, increasing
12
wariness of research and leading to tighter oversight. Over time,
tighter restrictions on research may lead some to think that progress
has been slowed and that in the name of protection, some groups
13
have missed out on important social benefits. This can cause a
swing back toward the paradigm of access. If social attitudes move
too far in this direction, inhibitions against offering or accepting certain risks may be reduced, which, in turn, can create the potential for
the abuse of research subjects.
Such difficulties are exacerbated by the special circumstances of
14
a public health emergency. In part, this is because the crisis setting
precipitates its own dynamic of conflict and uncertainty. In a very
real sense, uncertainty is likely to precede a public health emergency
as the community and relevant authorities attempt to determine the
scope and severity of the emerging outbreak. Beyond this, uncertainties emerge concerning who has been infected, where it is safe to travel, who it is safe to associate with, how to protect oneself from becoming infected, and what to do once one becomes infected. There

9

See Rebecca Dresser, Wanted: Single, White Male for Medical Research, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Jan.–Feb. 1992, at 24, 26–27; Charles Weijer & Robert A. Crouch, Why
Should We Include Women and Minorities in Randomized Controlled Trials?, 10 J. CLINICAL
ETHICS, 100, 100 (1999).
10
John D. Lantos, The “Inclusion Benefit” in Clinical Trials, 134 J. PEDIATRICS 130,
131 (1999).
11
Id. at 130. Explanations for the apparent benefit of participation in trials include “selection bias, placebo effects, and adherence to well-defined protocols.” Id.
12
Id. at 131.
13
See Dresser, supra note 9, at 26–27.
14
Working Group on “Governance Dilemmas” in Bioterrorism Response, Leading
During Bioattacks and Epidemics with the Public’s Trust and Help, 2 BIOSECURITY &
BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY PRAC. & SCI. 25, 27–29 (2004).
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are also social uncertainties surrounding the basic institutions of the
community. Do government and public health authorities grasp the
magnitude of what is unfolding? Are public health and medical institutions responding in a way that is effective, or are they merely trying
to prevent panic?
Public health emergencies are also scenes of conflict. To some
degree, the mere emergence of pandemic flu will stress the social fabric of affected communities, and this, in turn, has the potential to
inflame and widen existing social, racial, and economic fault lines.
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that difficult decisions will
have to be made about how best to deploy scarce social resources.
Adding to such pressures is the special dread that accompanies public
health emergencies, born of the widespread perception that ordinary
social and ethical norms may not have the same force in this new
context. Such worries may permeate social relations, and they have
already been raised in the context of rationing scarce resources, such
15
as flu vaccines and antivirals. But they are likely to have special force
in the context of research where a proclivity toward utilitarian thinking is likely to be emboldened. In particular, as the threat to society
increases, and research represents a credible means of stemming the
tide of death and disease, the potential benefits for the many may be
seen as large enough to outweigh even dramatic and certain risks to a
few. Perhaps paradoxically, however, to the extent that individuals
perceive that their personal interests may be unduly subordinated to
or sacrificed for advances in understanding, they may refuse to participate in research. Such concerns are likely to be particularly salient
16
in disadvantaged or otherwise marginalized communities.
On the other hand, although eschewing the conduct of research
in a public health crisis may reduce some problems of social solidarity, it poses its own challenges to institutional trust. Directly deploying
non-validated interventions under the umbrella of the state’s national
security or public health emergency powers (as was recently en17
hanced by the Project BioShield Act of 2004 ) does not eliminate or
reduce uncertainty about the relative merits of those interventions. It
therefore does not address the larger community’s uncertainty about
whether the methods of crisis response being deployed in the com-

15
See John D. Arras, Rationing Vaccine During an Avian Influenza Pandemic: Why It
Won’t Be Easy, 78 YALE J. BIOLOGY & MED. 283, 287–300 (2005).
16
See Freimuth et al., supra note 8, at 797–98.
17
See Stuart L. Nightingale et al., Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) to Enable Use of
Needed Products in Civilian and Military Emergencies, United States, 13 EMERGING
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1046, 1048–49 (2007).
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munity are safe and effective. This failure, in turn, may engender legitimate frustration, not only about the uncertainties that may attend
exposure to an investigational intervention, but also about the inability to learn from this experience in order to reduce the uncertainties,
and therefore the risks, that community members face in the future.
Some of these tensions appeared in the response to the anthrax
18
attacks on the U.S. Capitol in 2001. Given the uncertainty about
how best to treat individuals who were at risk for inhalational anthrax, treatment recommendations changed over time. On December
21, 2001, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services published a list of three preventative treatment options for persons at risk
for inhalational anthrax, some of whom had already completed the
19
recommended 60-day regimen of antibiotics. These were:
1) 60 days of antimicrobial prophylaxis, accompanied by monitoring for illness; 2) 40 additional days of antimicrobial prophylaxis
(intended to provide protection against the theoretical possibility
that anthrax spores might cause illness up to 100 days after exposure) accompanied by monitoring for illness or adverse reactions;
and 3) 40 additional days of [antimicrobial] prophylaxis plus 3
20
doses of anthrax vaccine administered over a 4-week period.

The recommendation stated that, “[a]s an investigational new drug,
the vaccine should be administered with informed consent, and vaccinated persons may participate in a follow-up evaluation measuring
21
the effect of the vaccine when administered after exposure.”
Uncertainty about the relative merits of these options created
22
the rationale for an important prospective trial. Yet a failure to
communicate the nature of the uncertainty and the importance of
18

For information regarding the background of the anthrax attacks and reactions to them, see Janice C. Blanchard et al., In Their Own Words: Lessons Learned from
Those Exposed to Anthrax, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 489 (2005); Sandra Crouse Quinn et
al., The Anthrax Vaccine and Research: Reactions from Postal Workers and Public Health Professionals, 6 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY PRAC. & SCI. 321
(2008) [hereinafter Quinn et al., Anthrax Vaccine]; Sandra Crouse Quinn et al., Postal
Workers’ Perspectives on Communication During the Anthrax Attack, 3 BIOSECURITY &
BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY PRAC. & SCI. 207 (2005) [hereinafter Quinn et
al., Postal Workers’ Perspectives].
19
Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention (CDC), Notice to Readers: Additional Options for Preventive Treatment for Persons Exposed to Inhalational Anthrax, 50 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY
WKLY.
REP.
1142,
1142,
1151
(2001),
available
at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5050a5.htm.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 1151.
22
See Denise L. Doolan et al., The US Capitol Bioterrorism Anthrax Exposures: Clinical
Epidemiological and Immunological Characteristics, 195 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 174, 175
(2007).
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research to its resolution, along with differing perceptions of whether
participation in the follow-up research was mandatory or optional,
contributed to a perception of differential treatment between the
predominantly white population of the Senate office building and
the predominantly African American population of U.S. postal work23
ers. Moreover, the postal workers made explicit reference to the
now infamous Tuskegee syphilis study in expressing concern that
they were being subjected to experimentation that was inconsistent
24
with their own basic health interests.
Finally, the perception on the part of at least some groups that
the research enterprise itself may be particularly risky raises the prospect that some who were offered the investigational vaccine may have
perceived the alternative of not participating in the research followup as involving less risk than participating. In actuality, if there was a
difference, it is likely that not participating in the follow-up may have
involved greater risk, if individuals received less frequent or careful
25
monitoring from their personal physicians. Additionally, reluctance
to participate in research impedes the process of gathering the information necessary to improve the standard of care moving forward.
To be clear, coping with these dynamics of conflict and uncertainty requires a variety of efforts on the part of a diverse array of
stakeholders. Even in the best of circumstances, it is unlikely that
these issues can be eliminated entirely, and it would be nearly impossible to eliminate them simply by adopting a particular framework for
assessing the ethics of research. As such, one test for the adequacy of
a framework of research ethics is not whether it can eradicate these
tensions, but whether it can help manage them in a way that reconciles the demands of advancing science with the goal of preserving
and enhancing social solidarity and institutional trust as best as is
feasible under the non-ideal conditions of an emergency situation.
III. THE NEED FOR GUIDANCE
There is currently widespread consensus about a menu of criteria that must be met in order for clinical research to be ethically ac26
ceptable. For example, the research must be socially valuable, the

23

Blanchard et al., supra note 18, at 492.
Id. at 493; Quinn et al., Anthrax Vaccine, supra note 18, at 328.
25
See, e.g., Franklin G. Miller & Howard Brody, A Critique of Clinical Equipoise: Therapeutic Misconception in the Ethics of Clinical Trials, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May–June
2003, at 17, 21–22.
26
See Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a) (2008); NAT’L COMM’N
FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, BELMONT
24
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risks to participants should be minimized, risks that cannot be eliminated should be reasonable, the selection of subjects should be fair,
the representation of various subgroups of the populations should be
equitable, and where possible, participants should participate only af27
ter having given their free and informed consent. One ambition of
acceptable frameworks for research ethics is to help researchers,
sponsors, IRB members, and community members assess research
protocols in light of these criteria in a coherent, ethically defensible,
and interpersonally justifiable manner. Unfortunately, the two most
popular frameworks for guiding the ethical assessment of clinical research each suffer from significant limitations.
The first of these frameworks, what I call the “common rule approach,” adopts a sort of constrained utilitarian approach to evaluating research. Its proponents regard this as a utilitarian approach to
the extent that it fundamentally involves trading risks to research participants for advances in science that will promote the welfare of fu28
ture patients. It is a constrained utilitarian approach, however, because the scope of this utilitarian calculus is limited or constrained by
29
additional moral requirements. For example, the requirement to
respect the autonomy of research participants constrains the underlying utilitarian aspirations of the approach because advances in social
welfare alone cannot justify conscripting subjects into clinical re30
search without their free and informed consent. Similarly, requirements of fairness prohibit research from unduly targeting vulnerable,
31
marginalized, or disadvantaged populations.
Proponents of this position have also argued that the underlying
utilitarian calculus is constrained in an additional dimension. That
is, they view the reasonableness of risks as a fundamentally utilitarian
question about whether the expected benefits of a research initiative
are sufficient to justify the various risks and burdens to participants
that are not already justified by the prospect of direct benefit to those
32
same individuals. But they argue that even here, these tradeoffs

REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS
OF RESEARCH, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192, 23,193–97 (Apr. 18, 1979) [hereinafter BELMONT
REPORT]; Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., What Makes Clinical Research Ethical?, 283 JAMA
2701, 2701–07 (2000).
27
See BELMONT REPORT, supra note 26, at 23,195–97.
28
See Miller & Brody, supra note 25, at 21.
29
See id. at 23; see also sources cited supra note 26 (describing additional moral
requirements that constrain this utilitarian approach).
30
See Miller & Brody, supra note 25, at 23.
31
Id. at 24.
32
Id. at 21.
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should not cross over a moral threshold, the threshold of exploita33
tion.
Unfortunately, the requirement not to exploit participants appears to lack substantive content distinct from the idea of ensuring
34
that the tradeoffs in risk and benefit are reasonable. That is, we are
told that in order for subjects to be exploited they would have to be
subjected to risks that were not reasonable in light of the anticipated
benefits, either to participants themselves or to the larger communi35
ty. Because the determination of whether subjects are exploited requires a determination of whether the risks to participants are outweighed by the various potential benefits of the research, this
requirement does not provide an additional, independent constraint
on the underlying utilitarian calculus. Rather, if anything, the touchstone for avoiding exploitation in this context appears to be simply
ensuring that risks to participants can be justified on utilitarian
grounds.
Furthermore, this approach provides almost no additional guidance to stakeholders about how to make such determinations in practice. Individual researchers, sponsors, IRB members, and community
members more generally, are left to their own devices to provide
some rough estimate of the value of individual research initiatives
and how to weigh or trade that kind of value against the risks to
which research participants would be exposed. Moreover, even the
appeal to “utilitarianism” here obscures the fact that “utilitarianism”
is the name of a fairly large family of views, some of which differ sig36
nificantly in their operational content. As a result, this approach
provides woefully little practical guidance to the stakeholders that
have to rely on it. Moreover, because there are myriad ways of specifying the key variables in determining when risks are reasonable, this
approach provides a veneer of operational content to what will ultimately be a contest of diverse and potentially competing intuitions.
Stakeholders are likely to need practical guidance most in cases
where intuitions conflict. At some point, even the most rigorous
33

See id.
See Alex John London, Reasonable Risks in Clinical Research: A Critique and a Proposal for the Integrative Approach, 25 STAT. MED. 2869, 2871–72 (2006) [hereinafter
London, Reasonable Risks]; Alex John London, Two Dogmas of Research Ethics and the
Integrative Approach to Human-Subjects Research, 32 J. MED. & PHIL. 99, 101–02 (2007)
[hereinafter London, Two Dogmas].
35
See London, Reasonable Risks, supra note 34, at 2871–72; London, Two Dogmas,
supra note 34, at 101–02.
36
For a convenient summary of possible consequentalist views, see SHELLY KAGAN,
NORMATIVE ETHICS 25–69, 189–239 (1998).
34
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framework for decision making must rely on the good will, common
sense, and practical judgment of those who must apply it. But for the
common rule approach, this point is reached sooner than it need
be—as soon as intuitions conflict. Moreover, to the extent that this
framework provides deliberators with relatively anemic resources for
justifying their judgments to their fellow citizens, it may create the
appearance, if not the reality, of a degree of arbitrariness to decision
making that may undermine social trust in the institutions of clinical
or public health research.
The second most popular framework attempts to remedy some
of these shortcomings by introducing moral norms that can be used
to determine, with greater operational clarity, when research risks are
reasonable. I have referred to this as the “duty of personal care approach,” because the various proposals that fall under this heading
share the foundational normative idea that, like physicians, research37
ers owe a duty of personal care —sometimes referred to as a thera38
39
peutic obligation or a fiduciary duty —to each research participant.
On this view, risks to participants are reasonable when they are con40
sistent with, or do not abrogate, this duty.
The duty of personal care is thus supposed to provide a substan41
tive constraint on permissible risk. In order to provide operational
guidance to deliberators, variants of this approach agree that it is
permissible for the treatment of research participants to be determined by a random process only if there is reasonable uncertainty
about the relative therapeutic merits of the interventions to which
42
participants might be allocated.
Different frameworks that fall under this heading can then be
43
distinguished by the way that they specify key variables. First, whose
uncertainty matters? Proponents of the “uncertainty principle” argue

37

CHARLES FRIED, MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION: PERSONAL INTEGRITY AND SOCIAL
POLICY 49–50 (1974).
38
Don Marquis, Leaving Therapy to Chance, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1983, at
40, 42.
39
Paul B. Miller & Charles Weijer, Rehabilitating Equipoise, 13 KENNEDY INST.
ETHICS J. 93, 95 (2003).
40
See id. at 112.
41
See id.
42
See id. at 91; see also Austin Bradford Hill, Medical Ethics and Controlled Trials, 1
BRIT. MED. J. 1043, 1047 (1963).
43
See Alex John London, Clinical Equipoise: Foundational Requirement or Fundamental Error?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BIOETHICS 571, 573–77 (Bonnie Steinbock
ed., 2007).
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44

that it must be the individual clinician-researcher. Proponents of
45
clinical equipoise argue that it should be the medical community.
Proponents of community equipoise argue that it should be the
46
broader social community, not just the medical community.
Second, what is the epistemic threshold for determining when
uncertainty obtains and when it has been disturbed? Proponents of
theoretical equipoise adopt a fragile epistemic threshold that is disturbed as soon as the various arms of the trial are no longer judged to
be an equal bet in prospect. Proponents of clinical equipoise adopt a
more robust threshold according to which uncertainty exists so long
as the evidence about the relative merits of the interventions in question is not of sufficient weight to change clinical practice in the expert community.
This general approach has some distinct advantages and the view
that I outline below incorporates several of them. Before turning to
that discussion, I want to note two substantial limitations to this approach.
First, the claim that researchers owe participants a duty of personal care is often grounded on the assumption that, even in the context of research, researchers are still in some fundamental respect
acting as physicians. This claim is most plausible in cases where researchers are in fact physicians; it is less plausible in cases where researchers are, for example, public health workers. Moreover, in some
public health contexts, the interventions in question may be applied
directly to the environments in which individuals live, rather than to
individuals themselves. Such public health research may nevertheless
involve human subjects and may have equally momentous implications for their health and welfare. It is not clear that the norms of the
physician-patient relationship are applicable in such cases, or that
they are the proper norms for regulating this kind of research, but an

44

See Hill, supra note 42, at 1047; Richard Peto et al., Design and Analysis of Randomized Clinical Trials Requiring Prolonged Observation of Each Patient (pt. 1), 34 BRIT. J.
CANCER 585, 606–07 (1976); Richard Peto & Colin Baigent, Trials: The Next 50 Years,
317 BRIT. MED. J. 1170, 1170 (1998); David L. Sackett, Equipoise, a Term Whose Time (If
It Ever Came) Has Surely Gone, 163 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 835, 836 (2000).
45
See Benjamin Freedman, Equipoise and the Ethics of Clinical Research, 317 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 141, 144 (1987) [hereinafter Freedman, Equipoise]; see also Benjamin
Freedman, Placebo-Controlled Trials and the Logic of Clinical Purpose, 12 IRB: REV. HUM.
SUBJECTS RES. 1, 5 (1990) [hereinafter Freedman, Placebo-Controlled Trials].
46
Fred Gifford, Community-Equipoise and the Ethics of Randomized Clinical Trials, 9
BIOETHICS 127, 128–29 (1995); Jason H. T. Karlawish & John Lantos, Community Equipose and the Architecture of Clinical Research, 6 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 385,
385–86 (1997).
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adequate framework for evaluating research should be broad enough
in scope to apply to all research involving human subjects.
The second limitation is more subtle, but perhaps of much
greater significance. To see it, consider the following dilemma. The
duty of personal care sets the parameters for acceptable risk in this
approach, and this duty has been traditionally understood as requiring individual clinicians “to benefit their patients ‘according to their
47
best judgment.’” How should we understand the content of this duty? One possibility is to view it as requiring researchers to advance
the medical best interests of participants without reference to the
broader goals and values of individual participants themselves. One
advantage of this interpretation is that its application does not require an appeal to the particular valuations of individual trial participants. This makes it suited to current practice since IRBs and others
must determine that the risks in any proposed study are reasonable
before they may permissibly seek the informed consent of potential
participants.
However, this interpretation risks being overly restrictive and paternalistic. Presumably, for instance, it would prohibit healthy volunteers from participating in most research at least to the extent that
such participants are subjected to some affirmative risks in order to
advance science. Moreover, this interpretation is far more rigid than
the way this duty is commonly interpreted in the context of clinical
48
medicine. With the rejection of medical paternalism has come the
recognition that health values are not necessarily a person’s preeminent or paramount concern and, as a result, respect for persons requires caregivers to advance the health interests of patients in a way
49
that is responsive to the broader goals and values of such persons.
Given this recognition, physicians routinely assist patients in undertaking medical procedures that pose affirmative risks to the patient
50
that are not compensated by direct medical benefits to that patient.
For example, living persons who donate a lobe of their liver or one of
their kidneys for transplantation are exposed to the risks and burdens
of the surgical procedure, the prospect of infection, and a small
probability of death, all for the benefit of the organ recipient.
Assume, therefore, that we understand the duty of personal care
as a duty to advance the medical best interests of subjects in a way
47

BELMONT REPORT, supra note 26, at 23,194.
Id.
49
ALAN H. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 185–86
(1980).
50
BELMONT REPORT, supra note 26, at 23,193 n.* (first footnote).
48
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that is informed by the broader goals and values of those persons.
Now rigidity and paternalism are eliminated, but at the cost of the determinacy or operational content of the standard. In part, this is because this standard must be applied before it is permissible to offer
participation in the study to participants. It therefore faces a kind of
catch-22: the parameters for acceptable risk are set by the physician’s
duty to advance the medical best interests of individual patients, consistent with that individual’s broader goals and values, but this standard must be used by an IRB to assess the acceptability of risks in a
clinical trial before participation can be offered to any particular individual. That is, IRBs must apply this test before they have any information about the values of potential trial participants. Moreover,
if the duty of personal care permits assisting patients in advancing
their project of helping others through living organ donation, then it
may also be permissible to ask research participants to forgo significant health benefits, or to bear significant risks and burdens, for the
purpose of advancing science. While this may indeed be permissible,
it becomes questionable whether the physician’s duty of personal
care now provides an independent constraint on the reasonableness
of risks.
These problems are only exacerbated when considering research
that might be carried out in the midst of a public health emergency.
On the one hand, community members should be able to view research as a viable means of serving the common good, and it seems
reasonable that they should be permitted to bear some affirmative
risks to themselves in order to help their compatriots. At the same
time, it seems reasonable to think that members of a pluralistic community will disagree about the nature and extent of the risks that social institutions can offer to community members, even in the service
of noble ends. Additionally, the strains on institutional trust and social solidarity will likely only be exacerbated if disagreement about
the latter issue erupts in the context of a public health emergency.
IV. AN OUTLINE OF THE INTEGRATIVE APPROACH
Forging social solidarity within liberal democratic communities
poses a challenge even under non-emergency situations because such
communities are characterized by, and often explicitly committed to
fostering, social pluralism. That is, individual community members
may disagree about fundamental questions of value, including the
value of various life plans, the importance of various social goals or
objectives, and the means that are appropriate for advancing or attaining these. This disagreement, in turn, creates a challenge for se-
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curing institutional trust, insofar as some may regard important social
institutions as offering undue assistance or support to some segments
of the community while neglecting or frustrating the projects or
plans of others.
In order to preserve or foster institutional trust in the context of
a public health emergency, social institutions, such as the institutions
responsible for emergency response and conducting clinical and public health research, require a social standpoint that the members of
such communities can recognize as appropriate for making important social decisions. Moreover, if this standpoint is sufficiently compelling to secure the allegiance of community members, it may provide a lever for preserving or enhancing social solidarity.
A. The Theoretical Underpinning of the Integrative Approach
The integrative approach constructs the required standpoint by
51
adapting a distinction first enunciated by John Rawls. Rawls notes
that members of liberal democratic communities may differ radically
52
in what I call their “personal interests.” These “personal interests”
are interests that agents have in their personal conception of the
good and the distinctive projects and plans that they adopt as a
53
means of pursuing this conception. Differences in and disagreements about personal interests are a common source of conflict in
social decision making and public policy. But, Rawls argues, this firstorder conflict over values and ends is predicated on a shared, higherorder interest in the ability of each individual to advance his or her
first-order interests effectively without unwarranted outside interfe54
rence.
Within the integrative approach, this shared higher-order interest in being free to advance one’s personal interests provides the basis for distinguishing and giving evaluative priority to what I call “basic interests.” Basic interests are interests that agents have in being
able to cultivate and to exercise those fundamental human capacities
that are constitutive of what Rawls refers to as our two moral powers:
the capacity to formulate and to pursue a life plan based on a conception of the good and the capacity to regulate our conduct with
55
others on the basis of principles of right. Such basic interests in51

See John Rawls, Social Unity and Primary Goods, in UTILITARIANISM
159, 159–85 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982).
52
Id. at 160–61.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 164–65.
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clude developing and exercising one’s capacities for reflective
thought and practical decision making, developing and cultivating
one’s basic affective or emotional capacities, and having the effective
freedom to exercise those capacities in the pursuit of particular
56
projects and meaningful social relationships.
The integrative approach uses this shared higher-order interest
to define a social position of common ground from which decisions
can be made about how basic social institutions should be regulated
and to define the “space of equality,” the domain over which all
community members have a just claim to equal treatment. Although
individuals may adopt particular life plans that have little in common
or that conflict or diverge in fundamental ways, all can recognize that
each requires the ability to cultivate and to exercise certain basic
physical, intellectual, emotional, and social capacities to be able to
pursue a life plan. Moreover, despite differences in dress, demeanor,
or aspiration, each person can recognize every other person as a
moral and political equal because each person’s ability to pursue a
distinctive and meaningful life plan is predicated on his or her ability
to safeguard and to advance these basic interests.
I refer to this as an “integrative” approach because it tries to find
ways of resolving social conflicts that safeguard and advance the underlying basic interests of the relevant parties. To this end, it holds
that the basic institutions of a society treat individuals as political
equals, not by striving to advance the personal ends of any set of individuals, but by safeguarding and advancing, for each individual, those
basic interests that make possible the pursuit of a reasonable life plan
from among a rich array of possible alternatives. That is, these basic
institutions operate in a fair way by working to ensure that every individual can function effectively in those rudimentary ways that are necessary in order to be able to pursue some distinctive life plan. In this
regard, the integrative approach seeks to be responsive to the idea
57
that each individual is a source of value in his or her own right. Unlike consequentialist theories that view individuals as repositories for
some more fundamental value, such as pleasure or welfare, the integrative approach seeks to respect the status of each community
member as the political equal of every other without summing the in58
terests of community members together. It does this in several ways.

56
57
58

Id. at 165–66.
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 29 (1971).
Id. at 32.
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First, on this view, when the basic interests of some individuals
are threatened, endangered, or inadequately protected, the importance of those interests to the individuals’ ability to advance their
first-order interests provides the normative ground for a claim to assistance from their compatriots. In the face of a public health emergency, for example, each community member whose basic interests
are threatened has an equal claim on the basic institutions of their
society to use the best practices available to safeguard and to advance
their basic health interests.
Second, the imperative to meet these claims as effectively and efficiently as possible provides the justification for creating a social division of labor in which some community members are empowered to
advance the basic interests of others in a particular sphere or domain.
The institutions of clinical and public health research are one element within this larger social division of labor. Their special role,
what might be called their moral mission, is to bridge gaps between
the basic health needs of community members and the capacity of
59
the community’s health-related institutions to meet those needs.
Members of a pluralistic, liberal, democratic community have a compelling interest to support the research enterprise insofar as it serves
as an engine for improving the capacity of public health care institutions to fulfill their social role more effectively, either now or in the
60
future.
Finally, in order to clarify some of the moral constraints on the
way that permissible research may be carried out, the integrative approach focuses on two aspects of the link between the basic interests
of community members and the network of social institutions that are
necessary to preserve and advance them. First, as one element within
the larger social division of labor, research should empower those
who are willing to take on, as part of their particular life plan, the
project of preserving the basic health interests of community members. This means that research participants should be able to dedicate their time and energy, and to accept some personal risk, in order
to advance science for the common good. Second, although those
whose basic interests are threatened or endangered can make a legitimate demand on their compatriots to provide them with aid or relief, no party can claim that the preservation or advancement of his
or her basic interests is more important than the basic interests of

59

See Alex John London, Justice and the Human Development Approach to International Research, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.–Feb. 2005, at 24, 24–25.
60
Id. at 34.
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their compatriots. As a result, although the institutions that divide
social labor for the purpose of advancing the basic interests of community members may empower individuals to advance the common
good, the same concern must be shown for the basic interests of
those who make this mission possible as for those that the institutions
seek to benefit. In other words, the justification for including clinical
and public health research in a division of social labor aimed at advancing the basic interests of community members does not permit
showing a lesser regard for the basic interests of research participants
or otherwise compromising their status as political equals of their
compatriots in the process.
B. Equality and the Integrative Approach
It is within this general context that the integrative approach
understands a general principle that I refer to as the Principle of
Equality. The principle holds that as a necessary condition for ethical
permissibility, research with human subjects must be designed and carried out
so as not to undermine the standing of research participants as the moral and
political equals of their compatriots, by either knowingly compromising their
basic interests or showing unequal concern for their basic interests and the interests of the people the research is intended to serve. The integrative approach uses two operational criteria to specify the terms on which
important research can be advanced without compromising the status
of research participants as the moral and political equals of their
compatriots.
1.

The First Operational Criterion for Preserving Equality

The first operational criterion for preserving equality consists of
two necessary conditions for ethically acceptable research in the context of a public health emergency. These conditions are that (1) the
risks to subjects should be reduced to those that are necessary to address an important public health question, and (2) when research participants’ basic interests are threatened by sickness, injury, or disease, they must receive a level of
care and protection for their basic interests that does not fall below what at
least a reasonable minority of the expert clinical or public health community
would regard as the most appropriate method of response available.
Condition (1) entails the position that it is never acceptable to
expose research participants to risks that are gratuitous or more significant than is necessary. Under this condition, research should take
place in the context of a public health emergency only if it could not
feasibly take place in another context. This requirement also covers
more than risks to basic interests since the personal interests of re-
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search participants may not be widely shared but may nevertheless be
of profound importance to the particular individual.
Condition (2) articulates the mechanism that determines the
level of care and protection that must be provided to research participants whose basic interests are threatened by sickness, injury, or disease in order to ensure that they are respected as the moral equals of
their compatriots. It does this by allowing participants to be allocated
only to trial arms that provide a level of care or protection that does
not fall below what at least a reasonable minority of the expert clinical or public health community would recommend as the method
with the best overall prospect of safeguarding or advancing their basic interests. The focus here on not falling below this standard is
meant to capture the idea that even when there is significant uncertainty or widespread disagreement about what constitutes the best response to a particular problem, it is often possible to identify interventions that would not be regarded as such by even a reasonable
minority of the relevant expert community.
Before turning to the second operational criterion, I want to
note that condition (2) articulates the parameters for what kind of
offers researchers can make to potential research participants. The
focus on basic interests in this condition reflects the idea that community members owe one another a social division of labor that preserves and protects the rudimentary building blocks that individuals
need in order to be free to pursue a distinctive life plan. It is not
permissible to offer to potential participants research studies providing a lower level of care and protection for the participants’ basic interests. However, community members can ask one another to risk,
sacrifice, alter, or limit ends or goals that are part of their individual
life plan in an effort to secure for others the freedom to pursue and
revise such a life plan of their own. In this view, properly functioning
IRBs should permit public health researchers to ask participants to
endure unpleasant experiences, inconveniences, or to bear other
burdens that do not compromise their basic interests, so long as such
risks or burdens are necessary for the conduct of sound science and
have been reduced as much as possible. It is then up to individuals,
via the process of informed consent, to evaluate these offers and to
decide whether those particular burdens are reasonable in light of
the goals of the research.
The guidance in the first operational criterion may need to be
augmented for two reasons. First, it may be desirable to carry out research in the context of a public health emergency that does not evaluate methods of crisis intervention and response. Such research may
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involve, for example, the evaluation of diagnostic tests or studies that
increase our understanding of conditions of sickness and disease that
arise in a public health emergency.
Second, even when research studies interventions for public
health emergency response, the application of these interventions in
the context of research may differ from their application in a nonresearch context. In particular, additional testing or procedures may
be required in order to advance research goals that would not be required in another context. Often, the most immediate effects of such
purely research-related elements of a study implicate only the personal interests of participants, as their risks are limited to some degree of bodily intrusion or discomfort. But even in this case, such
procedures nevertheless pose some additional, incremental risk to
the basic interests of study participants. As a result, additional guidance is necessary to determine when such incremental risks to the basic interests of participants are consistent with an equal regard for the
basic interests of participants and nonparticipants.
2.

The Second Operational Criterion for Preserving
Equality

The integrative approach uses a second operational criterion to
apply the principle of equality to risks that arise from purely researchrelated elements of clinical and public health research. The second
operational criterion requires that in all cases, the cumulative incremental risks to the basic interests of individuals that are derived from research activities and not offset by the prospect of direct benefit to the individual must
not be greater than the risks to the basic interests of individuals permitted in
the context of other socially sanctioned activities that are similar in structure to
the research enterprise.
The second operational criterion recognizes that respect for the
moral equality of individuals cannot require that they be prohibited
from voluntarily assuming some degree of risk to their basic interests,
in part because such a standard simply could not be achieved. Even
routine activities involve some incremental risk to a person’s basic interests and in liberal, democratic communities, individuals routinely
participate in activities posing some degree of additional risk to their
basic interests.
The challenge, therefore, is to establish when incremental risks
to the basic interests of individuals violate the underlying commitment to moral equality. The second operational criterion represents
a proposal for how these comparisons might be effectuated in practice.
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C. Establishing Tests for Meeting the Operational Criteria
In order to ascertain when these operational criteria are satisfied
in practice, stakeholders require practical tests with well-defined operational content. The remainder of this essay is limited to discussing
research aimed at developing methods or interventions for public
health emergency response. This class of research has special importance because of its direct relevance to the capacity of public health
institutions to fulfill their social role more effectively in the future. It
also provides fertile ground for elaborating the content of the practical test for the first operational criterion articulated above. I will
conclude with some remarks about how a similar test for the second
operational criterion might be developed.
The integrative approach uses the following test to apply the first
operational criterion to research aimed at developing or evaluating
methods of interventions of public health emergency response: When
evaluating one or more methods or interventions for public health emergency
response, individuals must be allocated only to methods or interventions where
there is conflict or uncertainty in the expert public health community about
whether the provision of methods other than those under study could more adequately safeguard or advance the basic health interests of individuals.
This test ensures that two important objectives are met. First, as
I will discuss in greater detail in the next section, it promotes research that has significant social value. In particular, research that
satisfies this test is designed to resolve substantive conflicts about best
practices and advance the capacity of important social institutions to
provide more effective emergency response in the future.
Second, this test articulates the conditions that decision makers
can use to determine whether participants in a particular trial receive
a level of care or relief that does not fall below what would be recommended by at least a reasonable minority of experts in public
health as the most appropriate method for providing emergency re61
sponse. It does this by permitting individuals to be allocated to interventions on the condition of either uncertainty or conflict about
the relative merits of those interventions or methods for the basic interests of individuals in the particular case.
I use the term “uncertainty” to refer to a state in which relevant
public health experts have not formed a settled opinion about
whether one mode of crisis response is superior to another. This is
not a state of indifference, since I take the latter to refer to a belief
61

See BAYESIAN METHODS
dane ed., 1996).
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that the methods in question are of equivalent value. By contrast,
uncertainty represents a situation where the evidence supporting the
relative merits of candidate interventions is not of sufficient quantity
or quality to ground the conclusion that it is better than the relevant
comparator. The determination of the relevant comparator will depend on the state of knowledge in the relevant expert community. If,
for instance, there is no known effective intervention for a condition,
then a no-treatment or placebo arm may be an appropriate comparator. If there are several known effective interventions, then one or
more of these may be the appropriate comparator. In all cases, the
role of research is to generate the information that will allow experts
to clarify the relative merits of the various options in an effort to narrow the zone of uncertainty or conflict and to forge a social consensus on the appropriate standard of care.
In contrast to uncertainty, “conflict” refers to the state of affairs
in which at least a reasonable minority of experts champion one method as superior to some other method while at least a reasonable
minority of other experts champions another method as superior. In
this case, each side has a determinate conviction about what is best
for members of the affected population, but those convictions are in
62
conflict. The integrative approach permits individuals to be allocated—at random or by some other proper method—to any intervention that would be recommended for them by at least a reasonable
63
minority of clinical or public health experts.
When the condition of conflict exists, it may not be the case that
any individual expert is uncertain. Versions of the equipoise requirement that require individual experts to be uncertain would not
permit research to go forward under such conditions. But requiring
individual uncertainty and prohibiting research from moving forward
in the face of conflict between reasonable experts does not settle the
substantive conflict over the relative merits of the competing interventions. It merely consigns the affected populations to receiving a
particular intervention—perhaps as a result of the contingent fact of
who gets to make the relevant decision—without using the research

62
ISAAC LEVI, HARD CHOICES: DECISION MAKING UNDER UNRESOLVED CONFLICT 28–
35 (1986).
63
The approach that I argue for here thus captures what is most appealing about
approaches that rely on clinical equipoise, but in a way that is much more general.
For further discussion of clinical equipoise, see generally Freedman, Equipoise, supra
note 45; Freedman, Placebo Controlled Trials, supra note 45; London, supra note 43.
For an analysis of the respect in which the integrative approach is more general in
scope, see London, Two Dogmas, supra note 34, at 99–116.
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methods necessary to settle the substantive issue about whether one
64
of the alternatives is better than the others.
Undoubtedly, our ability to apply this framework in practice will
be enhanced by having a clear account of how to distinguish what I
65
am calling basic interests from non-basic interests. Even without
such clarification, however, this framework still provides substantive
guidance to decision makers. In particular, if there is uncertainty
about how to classify the interest in question, then the appropriate
default requirement for research in this context is to treat it as basic
and to apply the above stated practical test.
V. APPLICATIONS AND EXAMPLES: SARS, HIV/AIDS,
AND PANDEMIC INFLUENZA
At this point, some examples provide helpful guidance. During
the initial phases of the SARS outbreak, Muller and his colleagues
noted that caregivers in different locations adopted different strate66
gies for treating SARS victims. In the United States, for example,
67
clinicians chose to provide only supportive care. In other areas, clinicians were more aggressive in providing therapeutic interventions
68
to cover a wide range of bacterial and viral pathogens. In some of
these locations, ribavirin was identified as a promising therapeutic
agent, although considerable uncertainty remained about the relative
69
balance of risks and benefits associated with this treatment. The existence of this uncertainty led Muller and his colleagues to attempt to
70
design a clinical trial to evaluate the efficacy of ribavirin.
As they note, however, increasing reports of toxicity associated
with high-dose ribavirin therapy led to a preference for lower dose
71
regimens in Toronto.
Such reports, along with the isolation of
SARS-CoV and subsequent in vitro susceptibility studies, were sufficient to bring personnel in Toronto to discontinue ribavirin as a
72
treatment for SARS.
64

See Emily L. Evans & Alex John London, Equipoise and the Criteria for Reasonable
Action, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 441, 444-448 (2006); London, supra note 43, at 577–84.
65
See generally London, supra note 7 (discussing this distinction and its significance for larger debates about interpersonal tradeoffs in research ethics).
66
See Matthew P. Muller et al., Clinical Trials and Novel Pathogens: Lessons Learned
from SARS, 10 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 389, 389 (2004).
67
Id. at 391.
68
Id. at 389.
69
Id. at 389–94.
70
Id. at 389–91.
71
Id. at 390–91.
72
Muller et al., supra note 66, at 389.
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Currently, no consensus exists on the best practice for treating
73
SARS. However, if new animal and in vitro studies and an increased
understanding of SARS-CoV were to lead some experts to favor one
set of interventions while other experts favor a different set, then the
expert clinical community would move from a state of uncertainty into a state of conflict. The expert community may remain in conflict
about whether the relative net therapeutic advantage of one or more
of these options dominates or is clearly superior to supportive care
alone. If, on the other hand, some experts still believe, for example,
that the side effects of candidate agents are severe and their therapeutic merits sufficiently uncertain, then it may remain permissible to
randomize some participants to supportive care and others to promising candidate interventions.
This highlights the second important feature of the practical
test. Namely, it promotes research with significant social value. This
social value emanates from the fact that research meeting this test is
designed to resolve substantive conflicts about best practices and thereby advance the capacity of important social institutions to provide
more effective emergency response in the future.
Similarly, we are currently in the midst of a global HIV-AIDS
pandemic. A variety of preventative strategies have been tested in
74
75
clinical trials, ranging from vaccines to microbicides to male cir76
cumcision. In each of these cases, some investigational intervention
77
has been compared with a placebo or a no-treatment arm. The use
73

See Lauren J. Stockman, Richard Bellamy & Paul Garner, SARS: Systematic Review of Treatment Effects, 3 PLOS MED. 1525 (2006).
74
Margaret I. Johnston & Anthony S. Fauci, An HIV Vaccine—Challenges and Prospects, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 888, 888–90 (2008).
75
Janneke H.H.M. van de Wijgert & Robin J. Shattock, Vaginal Microbicides: Moving Ahead After an Unexpected Setback, 21 AIDS 2369, 2369 (2007).
76
See Bertran Auvert et al., Randomized, Controlled Intervention Trial of Male
Circumcision for Reduction of HIV Infection Risk: The ANRS 1265 Trial, 2 PLOS
MED. 1112, 1112 (2005); Robert C. Bailey et al., Male Circumcision for HIV Prevention in
Young Men in Kisumu, Kenya: A Randomised Controlled Trial, 369 LANCET 643, 643
(2007); Ronald H. Gray et al., Male Circumcision for HIV Prevention in Men in Rakai,
Uganda: A Randomized Trial, 369 LANCET 657, 657 (2007).
77
This statement is potentially misleading if it is taken to imply that participants
in these trials were provided with no care or preventative measures other than either
the investigational intervention or a placebo substitute. In actuality participants in
these trials are provided with a basket of care that is aimed at reducing their susceptibility to contracting HIV. This usually consists of the provision of counseling and
other social services, access to condoms, and even treatment for additional sexually
transmitted diseases. For example, Auvert and colleagues randomized participants
to immediate circumcision or to circumcision at a later date. See Auvert et al., supra
note 76 at 1113–14. Individuals in the latter arm could thus serve as a control for the
former group during the time they remained uncircumcised. Nevertheless, all sub-

LONDON (FINAL EDIT) (DO NOT DELETE)

1198

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

1/13/2010 2:32 PM

[Vol. 39:1173

of such designs is permissible in many of these trials because the distinctive immunological challenges posed by the HIV virus have resulted in an inability to replicate the successes that have been
78
achieved against more common viral agents. As a result, considerable uncertainty remains about whether a novel vaccine or microbicide will result in a net benefit to recipients. This is underscored by
79
80
evidence that in some instances, microbicides or vaccine candidates
may have increased the susceptibility of some recipients to seroconversion.
In contrast to HIV, we have a much better understanding of the
major immunological properties of the influenza virus. This is not to
say that our knowledge is perfect or that the influenza virus is not
constantly changing. It is to say, rather, that knowledge regularly
used to create vaccines for nonpandemic flu strains is being applied
fruitfully to the creation of vaccines for potential pandemic strains.
Several H5N1 vaccines have been developed; one has been licensed
81
in Europe, and another received FDA approval in 2007. Important
work is also underway to develop a cell-based vaccine, rather than the
traditional egg-based vaccine, and to develop adjuvant agents that
may reduce the dose necessary to produce an immune response in
82
recipients while also potentially broadening cross-clade immunity.
These vaccines do not appear to be as efficacious as vaccinations
for nonpandemic strains, but their true efficacy could only be ascertained in the face of an influenza outbreak. Although it is likely that
the clinical community may be uncertain or in conflict over the relative prophylactic merits of these various vaccine candidates, there
does not appear to be credible uncertainty about the relative merits
of at least some of these agents in comparison to comfort care or
83
non-vaccination. As a result, it would not be permissible to include
a placebo-only arm in an eventual trial of these various agents. This is
because the health consequences of contracting a pandemic flu strain

jects received counseling, condoms, and ancillary care for opportunistic infections.
See id. at 1114. For a general discussion of the importance of distinguishing the provision of placebo as a substitute for some element of standard therapy or prophylaxis
from the addition of placebo to standard therapeutic or prophylactic strategies, see
Stephen Senn, Placebo Misconceptions, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Sept. 2009, at 53.
78
Johnston & Fauci, supra note 74, at 889–90.
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are likely to be dire, and because the strong grounds for the belief
that the current FDA approved vaccine will provide recipients with a
significant degree of protection means that the option of a notreatment or placebo-only arm falls outside of the zone of uncertainty
or conflict within the relevant expert communities.
As the number of prophylactic or therapeutic candidates increases, it becomes more likely that there will be either uncertainty or
conflict in the expert clinical or public health communities about
how best to prevent or treat the particular pandemic strain that eventually does emerge. If this is the case, there may be significant utility
to designing head-to-head trials of the relevant interventions in order
to ascertain the best practices for prevention and treatment. But one
should not underestimate the potential difficulties associated with designing and conducting such a trial in the context of a public health
emergency. Among other things, careful consideration will have to
be paid to ensuring that a study hypothesis can be formulated in realtime that captures the relevant uncertainty or conflict in the expert
communities. This is likely to be particularly difficult in a context
where information is scarce or rapidly changing.
Bringing well-designed clinical trials to fruition in the fluid and
often uncertain context of a public health emergency poses thorny
logistical challenges. Such trials are also likely to be resourceintensive at a time when health-related resources are scarce and must
be shepherded with care. This means that the decision to initiate research in this context must be made with care. Nevertheless, it is of
paramount importance to enact research programs when there is
compelling reason to think that addressing the study hypothesis
represents one of, if not the best means of generating the information, interventions, practices, methods, or policies that are needed to
bridge significant gaps between the basic health interests of community members and the capacity of the community’s health-related
structures to safeguard or advance those interests.
VI. CONCLUSION
Whether social solidarity and institutional trust can be secured
or maintained when the common good is threatened by an actual
pandemic will hinge on a variety of factors, many of which involve
community planning, preparedness, and communication. The point
of the above analysis is not to claim that the integrative approach can
address all of these factors. It is, rather, to argue that it provides a
better foundation than the two most prominent alternatives for creating an institutional framework for clinical and public health research
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that would merit such trust and could provide an anchor for such solidarity, within a limited domain, if the community in which it were
implemented were fully aware of the terms on which it functions.
In particular, I have sketched an operational test that the integrative approach uses to provide greater practical guidance to stakeholders than is available from the common rule approach. This practical guidance is also grounded in higher-level moral commitments
that, I argue, should have broader normative scope than the relatively
parochial norms of the duty of personal care approach. This approach is also more flexible and less paternalistic than the duty of
personal care approach in that it provides a justification for an institutional design where it is permissible to offer some individuals the
opportunity to accept increased personal risks and bear greater personal burdens with the goal of advancing science that will serve the
common interest. At the same time, this approach recognizes that
the willingness of individuals to contribute to such endeavors may be
compromised by an institutional setup equating such a willingness
with a broad permission to disregard or to be indifferent to the basic
interests of research participants. Unlike the common rule approach, therefore, the integrative approach helps to eliminate uncertainty about the moral norms that structure the research process.
Further, it expresses a clear moral and practical commitment to fostering research that advances the common interest without compromising the moral and political equality of research participants in the
process.
Every framework of research ethics must provide stakeholders
with guidance on how to evaluate risks associated with purely research-related elements of clinical trials. Every framework must
therefore strike a balance between restricting the liberty of community members to freely accept some incremental risks to their basic interests and preserving public trust in the institutions of research as
adequately responsive to the rights and welfare of research participants.
The second operational criterion for preserving equality
represents a proposal for assessing clinical trial risks in a more transparent and systematic fashion. In order to generate a practical test
for this criterion, stakeholders will have to identify comparison classes
of activities that are sufficiently similar in structure to clinical research that they can be used to calibrate assessments of incremental,
research-related risks. I have argued elsewhere that structurally simi-
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lar activities should have certain features. For instance, the incremental risks to the basic interests of individuals who engage in these
activities should result from efforts to benefit others or to advance the
common good. Similarly, the risks associated with such activities
should be viewed as necessary evils and not as desirable in their own
right, as is often the case with dangerous pursuits such as rock climbing or motorcycle riding. To the extent possible, such activities
should also be the subject of social oversight or review so that there is
some reason to view their associated risks as socially acceptable.
I have proposed using the activities of public service professions,
85
such as paramedics or firefighters, as possible reference classes. It
may be useful to consider other public service professions as well,
such as social workers and even public health officials. The point of
this selection process is to construct comparison classes that can be
used to ensure that the incremental risks to the basic interests of research participants that are associated with purely research-related
elements of an investigation are not greater than the incremental
risks to the basic interests of others in the community who work on a
routine basis to advance the common good.
A public health emergency, however, is a unique situation. Elements of the larger infrastructure that supports a range of rights and
abilities of community members may be inoperative or compromised.
As recent experience with Hurricanes Katrina and Rita powerfully illustrated, public health crises can exacerbate preexisting social inequalities, exacting the harshest toll on marginalized, poor, or otherwise vulnerable groups. Special care must be taken, therefore, not to
place significant additional burdens on the basic interests of disaster
victims. Additionally, special care must be taken to ensure that the
burdens of such research are not disproportionately borne by persons who are already socially, economically, or politically disadvantaged and that special protections are in place to ensure that the risks
to individuals from such groups are minimized.
It will be important, therefore, to ensure that a wide range of
stakeholders are involved in the process of determining the content
of the practical test for the second operational criterion. It is also
important to ensure that this process is completed prior to the onset
of a major public health crisis.
Undoubtedly, many of the points made here will strike some
readers as controversial and in need of further philosophical defense,
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See London, Reasonable Risks, supra note 34, at 2881–83.
Id.
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refinement, or explication. I hope, however, that the outline provided here will persuade the charitable reader that it is worth undertaking this process of refinement and defense in earnest.

